Rupert Wieloch

Although the nature of war doesn’t change in the sense of its primeval violence and devastating effects, the way war is waged has changed dramatically in the past year. Throughout history, there has always been a balance between attrition and manoeuvre, or indirect fire and close combat. The invention of the tank in the 20th century gave the advantage to the latter, but missile and drone technology has reversed this in 21st century war.

So what has changed during the past year in the Russo-Ukrainian War? I see three major evolutions. The first is more civilian targeting; 2025 was the deadliest according to the UN and this year the trend has continued, with the grim attack on the Kyiv Flea Market last night as a prime example. The second is strategic targeting; Moscow has always used missiles to hit major cities in Ukraine, but advances in drone technology have allowed Kyiv to strike effectively all over Russia. The third is linked to the other two and is the most depressing of all – the rules of war are being increasingly broken in terms of treatment of prisoners and respect for non-combatants.

This is more and more looking like total war and the risks of further escalation, either in terms of violence spreading into Free Europe, or the use of battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine is increasing. So what should we do about it? One thing that isn’t being spoken about, which I believe would help, is to form a separate Air Defence (AD) branch in the MoD. Of course there will be huge resistance from the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force, but we must learn the lessons from the Middle East and Ukraine and adapt accordingly to the new character of war.

It has been a week of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and continuing calamities in Ukraine and the Middle East. However, I wish to focus on the fact that no one in the media is making the connection between the recent events in Mali and the sudden surge of migrants swimming into Spain.

I have written about Mali before. Timbuktu’s mythical reputation for Saharan gold and inaccessibility always intrigued me when I was serving in Libya. I was also extremely impressed by the British peacekeeping contribution to the UN Stabilisation Mission there and was very disappointed when the Royal Air Force Chinooks; Army Combat Teams; Medical Aid and Logistics Support on Operation Newcombe were pulled out after the Pandemic.

Since then, French influence has been replaced by Russian mercenaries, but they have not been able to quell the Jihadist rebels and Tuareg independence movement. This irregular alliance has recently advanced into government held territory and led to a surge of forced migration from the North African coast and in this case, the crisis in Cueta.

Now we learn that the Russians have reinforced their units with armoured vehicles that slipped through the English Channel recently, onboard the sanctioned freighter, Mikhail Britnev. Inevitably, the fighting will now become more bitter and the humanitarian consequences will worsen. It is time for the UN to roll up its sleeves, not just stand on the touchline.

When The UN Had Teeth

Or worse? The latest strikes this week are unlikely to bring long-term peace in the Middle East and more likely to lead to revenge attacks for the next decade. One could argue that there never was peace in the Middle East. However, before the beginning of Operation Epic Fury on 28 February 2026, there was diplomatic dialogue, free passage for everyone through the Gulf and economic success. Now, there is the chaos that was predicted by American think tanks, which you can see in the slide below.

Having failed to achieve its strategic objectives, the war has descended into tit-for-tat strikes over the control of the Strait of Hormuz, with the Gulf still closed for business (British Airways has not restarted its operations since they were stopped at the beginning of March). From afar it appears that a Superpower is illegally attempting to take what is not theirs through military blockades and coercion; some might call this colonisation except that it is all about Sea Power and Air Power. Gun boat diplomacy sometimes works, but the Iranian regime is unlikely to bow its head to Washington anytime soon.

Twenty-five years ago, we wrote a paper about America’s role as the World’s policeman after the end of the Cold War. At that time, the USA provided the largest financial support to UN peacekeeping and the World supported them by deploying their blue-helmet forces on the front line. How things have changed. Now, the USA has lost friends and allies, while Iran has gained support from rival powers. Washington’s clumsy demand for a 20% tariff this week is seen for what it is: a desperate attempt at extortion to pay for their folly. Surely, it must be time for a change of approach.

Is a combined arms fighting troops exercise in the United Kingdom that shows the British Public what it means to be At War. In the 1980s, the British Army of the Rhine practised their operating procedures with a deployment of 1st British Corps every autumn, after the farmers had collected their harvest. If it was particularly wet, our 60 ton battle tanks were restricted to roads and tracks. This continued in the UK until the Millennium. For example, in 1994, I organised a brigade FTX that took in the East Midlands, Cumbria, Northumberland and Scotland with live firing at Otterburn and Warcop and gruelling combat training in Kielder Forest.

The organisation of a Corps FTX is probably beyond our current crop of staff officers; for example it takes deep knowledge to co-ordinate a move of 3,000 vehicles without coming to a complete standstill and providing the enemy air force with a sitting-duck target. However, it would not be beyond their capability to link the major training areas of Salisbury Plain, Brecon, Dartmoor, and Otterburn with tanks. artillery and infantry moving between each of them.

The benefits would be two-fold. Firstly, we would relearn many military lessons that have been forgotten in the past 25 years. Second, the public would actually see the armed forces do something real at home not just in some far-away place. For too long, the military has been sidelined in the shadows compared with the American armed forces and those on the front line with Russia.

Exercise Lionheart in Germany

There is a tendency in government departments (and especially the MoD) of avoiding difficult choices. An amusing story that illustrates this is the way Michael Heseltine, as Secretary of State for Defence, avoided making the decision to centralise the three Schools of Music after a number of studies concluded that only one was necessary and money could be transferred to front line troops if one of the three was chosen. A less amusing example is the way the Comprehensive Spending Review of 2007 created the Black Hole that subsequently devastated the Armed Forces fighting capabilities.

Senior officers are as much to blame as the politicians. Between 1999 and 2006, I witnessed countless occasions when the Executive Committee of the Army Board avoided difficult decisions about equipment policy and resources and retreated to their comfort zones of cap-badges and uniforms. The Future Rapid Effects System was a classic army project that failed because it was rooted in theory rather than reality. The problems with Ajax are inherited from that failure combined with the MoD’s headcount reduction forced on the Technical Director’s teams in Abbey Wood (e.g the Reliability and Maintenance Group).

History seems to be repeating itself this month. Politicians are retreating to their comfort zones and avoiding the difficult decisions to meet the Nation’s needs for Defence. Despite the reassuring words from Dan Jarvis this week, we are no closer to resolving the key issues of how to build credible capabilities for the next decade – UAVs may be part of the answer, but Air Power alone will not win a modern war as the USA has learned this year. We need strong armour to deal with the threat.

When is a war not a war? Both Russia and America have begun wars against large independent countries this decade but denied they are in a war to their domestic audiences. In Putin’s words, the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was a “special military operation” to protect Russian national security. In Trump’s words, the “major combat operations in Iran” that he launched on 28 February 2026 were to ensure America “will never be threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran” and to facilitate regime-change.

Both these expensive operations have failed to achieve their stated aims and have stagnated with highly contested front lines in Eastern Ukraine and the Strait of Hormuz. However, there is a significant difference between the two wars. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Air, Maritime and Cyber forces are all engaged, but the vicious hand-to-hand fighting involving ground troops means that the neighbours are still At War and In War. In the Gulf War, the memorandum-of-understanding signed last week pretends that Iran and the USA are not At War, but we all know that the tit-for-tat strikes yesterday will continue and in reality, they remain stuck in a never-ending ideological war.

Why is this important? First, the legal consequences of starting a war of aggression. Second, the Global economic consequences of closing the flow of energy from the Gulf. Third, the diplomatic consequences of breaking the international rule-book. Can this situation be retrieved? Yes, but it will take a Mahatma Gandhi, or Nelson Mandela to overlook the grievances and heal the wounds. Who is waiting in the wings with the political and diplomatic credibility?