North Atlantic Treaty Conference

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

The Conference in Munich this weekend that has attracted World Leaders to speak about their security concerns and in particular the North Atlantic partnership, is not in fact a NATO conference. That happened the day before in a low-key affair in Brussels between most of the NATO Ministers of Defence (notably Pete Hesgeth, the US secretary of War, did not attend).

The most interesting aspect of these past five days is the press conference given by the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Wednesday evening. After his introduction, he was quizzed by 14 different news and media outlets, including some big hitters such as the Wall Street Journal and AFP. Two Russian News in Exile reporters asked questions as did two that broadcast in Ukraine and journalists from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Germany, Turkey and Japan. The only interest from London was Reuters’ Brussels based European Affairs Editor, who asked about the rebranding of NATO’s northern flank activities into “Arctic Sentry”.

Understandably, the main undercurrent of the conference was Rutte’s perspective of President Trump’s recent announcements, including when and by how much the USA will reduce its footprint in Europe. However, the greatest challenge to the Secretary General was the Japanese reporter, who asked specifically about the Chinese threat to the Arctic (which it does not border).

It may appear that a lot has changed since the US Secretary of Defence, Jim Mattis gave a joint press conference in Brussels with the then Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, exactly nine years ago today and said thank you for “the warm welcome back to my second home”. However, in March 2003, the UK MoD published a document that suggested a number of possible shocks, including a “Future US administration withdraws co-operation from international bodies such as the UN and NATO”.

We were warned!

Lessons From The Korean War

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

I am looking forward to giving my talk on two iconic battles of the Korean War tomorrow evening. As we sit between the 75th anniversaries of the Inchon Landings and the Battle of Imjin, it is worth reflecting on four lessons from that three year war, which resulted in over 2 Million deaths.

The first lesson is how the Free World came together to fight an authoritarian regime that invaded its neighbour. We saw the same thing when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The second is how President Truman said no when General MacArthur demanded that he should widen the war for all-out victory. Above all else, avoid nuclear Armageddon.

The third is about humanitarian operations to save refugees (the Miracle of Christmas) and prevent the forcible repatriation of prisoners when it is known they will be slaughtered (as happened to the Cossacks after World War II).

The fourth is how 73 years after the armistice, there is still no peace treaty and the Demilitarized Zone is the most heavily guarded frontier in the World. As MacArthur said: “There is no substitute for Victory”.

Each of these lessons is relevant to what is happening in Ukraine four years after Russia launched a full-scale invasion into its neighbour. If there is an armistice this year, we don’t have far to look for a precedent.

Centurion Tank At The Time Of The Korean War

Washington’s Original Requests For UK Troops In Southern Afghanistan

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

Three topics relevant to British Armed Forces tempted me to provide some context this week. However, I will save my observations about UN Failures, Chinese Security and Defence and The World’s Policeman for later in the month. Instead, I will concentrate on reinforcing my previous post about the false accusation that the USA never asked for military support in Afghanistan with evidence from two archival reports.

The first is drawn from the MoD lessons learned report from Afghanistan in 2002. “Following the defeat and removal of the Taleban regime in late 2001, the UK main effort focused on the leadership of ISAF to stabilise Kabul and ensure the meeting of the Loya Jurga in June. Meanwhile, US forces concentrated on the destruction of the remaining enemy pockets of resistance, particularly in the south-east, culminating in Operation Anaconda launched on 1 March 2002. The US was surprised at the ferocity of this battle and lost 8 men KIA… On 15 March 2002, the US formally requested the deployment of a UK fighting force and three days later [our] Secretary of State announced the deployment of a battle group, based on 45 Commando Royal Marines to come under tactical command of Commander 10 US Mountain Division.” In this role, Task Force Jacana as it was known, undertook four deliberate operations on the front line before it was withdrawn in July. There were many tactical lessons identified, but strategically, the mission was a huge success as it sent a powerful message to both friendly and hostile nations and allowed the Loya Jurga trouble-free progress against a background of relative security.

The second substantial US request came in 2005. Up to this point, British Armed Forces had run a very successful Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the north of the country. Washington now asked London if it would take over the PRT in Helmand Province as it was having difficulty gaining traction outside of the provincial capital. I deployed in October with the planning team to Kandahar, where a Royal Air Force Harrier flight was based. My task was to map out the urgent operational requirements for soldiers, vehicles, helicopters and the costs of third line support. There were also officers there to advise on reconstruction and economic alternatives to opium production. At that time, it was envisaged that we would send the Royal Anglian Regiment in 2006. However, this was changed to Headquarters 16 Air Assault Brigade together with a Parachute battalion. The resulting combat operation has been well-covered by the media in the past fortnight.

My final thought on this is to recognise the loss and sacrifices of all NATO nations in Afghanistan. I was a member of a guard of honour in Kandahar to say farewell to a Chinook crew that had been shot down. It was not just US and UK troops in that Ramp Parade saluting the dead as they were carried onto the C-17. All the national contingents were represented. To denigrate their contribution, as we heard last week, really is beyond the pale.

Helmand Task Force Planning Group in Kandahar 2005

A Little Off The Front Line

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

When I wrote the chapter on the UK’s response to 9/11 in my first book, the UK government asked me to remove six passages that, in their opinion, compromised British security. Their argument was that I had used privileged information that was classified as confidential or above. However, when I demonstrated that all these stories had already been published in the media and were available in open source material, the MoD relented and changed their tone.

The one story that they asked me to remove even though they accepted it was not secret, was about British casualties in Afghanistan before we deployed Helmand Task Force (Operation Herrick) in 2006. This is important now because the US President has claimed American Allies were “A little off the front line” and has disparaged our contribution by saying “We have never really asked anything of them”.

The code name of the operation before Herrick was Veritas and this covered other deployments such as Oracle, Fingal and Jacana. In the first months of Veritas, Washington requested our help in many ways and the Pentagon sent two officers to London to work with us to identify the best mix of assets. The British contribution included: Special Forces; Cruise Missiles and Air-to-Air Refuelling; 3 Commando Brigade, which helped clear the Tora Bora Caves and Headquarters 3rd Division, which established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. The idea that soldiers who worked on projects such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were “a little off the front line” is meaningless because nowhere was safe in Afghanistan after the initial deployment. Improvised explosive devices, ambushes and missile attacks against vehicles and bases occurred throughout the country from 2002 onwards.

It is time that our contribution was properly acknowledged by our most important ally.

British Troops Deploying At Kabul Airport On Operation Veritas

Heavy Lifting and NATO Caveats

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

The US President has made an important point about NATO, but sadly he has articulated it badly, so it will lose its effect.

The important point is that unlike authoritarian regimes, political democracies cannot allow their troops to be sacrificed on military operations, so they attach national caveats, which constrain commanders in certain circumstances. This inevitably results in perceived unequal burden sharing.

I personally witnessed this when planning NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. For example, in Baghdad, when I was Chief of Staff of the NATO Mission, there were only four countries that I could rely upon to deploy outside the green zone. However, this was not an insurmountable problem because there was a regular gathering of NATO ambassadors, or their representatives, who would diplomatically help with any issue before it became a crisis.

History tells us that political caveats have always affected Allied military operations and capital cities have always interfered with a “long screwdriver”. There is no better example than the one I write about in Churchill’s Abandoned Prisoners, when there were more than 120,000 Allied troops in Siberia in 1919. Of all the contingents, the one that came with the strictest constraints was the US Army detachment of 9,000 soldiers. Despite President Wilson forbidding them from fighting at the front, they did display courage and bravery in abundance when protecting their section of the Trans-Siberian Railway, but they did not do as the Royal Marines and join the battle at the front.

Apart from this issue of hypocrisy, the President is wrong to tar all of NATO with the same brush for three further reasons. The first has been picked up by the Media immediately; it is highly disrespectful to the families of soldiers, sailors and air personnel from NATO Allies who were killed on US led operations since 9/11. Secondly, there are still several ongoing NATO missions that might be compromised by his words; for example the Allied Maritime Command in London looks after North Atlantic operations and the NATO Mission in Iraq is there to fight terrorism and prevent the return of Islamic State. Thirdly, it makes it much harder for his representatives in Brussels when they come cap-in-hand to fill posts in the well-established bartering process for Troop Contributing Nations serving with American formations.

We all know that America has done most of the heavy lifting for NATO since it was created, but they could not have tackled International Terrorism without their Allies, so it is not sensible to alienate them now.

NATO Mission in Iraq 2008

Arctic Security

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

I have written before about my early experience with the ACE Military Force, when I patrolled inside the Arctic Circle as part of NATO’s northern flank protection mission, watched by Soviet Bear aircraft. Apart from three months winter warfare training in Northern Norway, we also took our tanks to Esbjerg, where I learned about Danish history at first hand. What impressed me particularly was the way Denmark rebuffed a megalomaniac bully in World War I and saved most of their Jewish community after Hitler invaded in World War II.

Danish DNA is one of the main constituents of British people, especially in the North East of England. We only have to look to the last century, when a Danish princess became Queen Consort of the United Kingdom, to see how close we are. And a wise Danish king, who ruled England one thousand years ago, gave us one of the most important freedoms ingrained in British law: a freeholder’s right to protect their crops and domestic animals from harm.

I have given talks about civil-military co-operation in Oslo and Stockholm and had the honour to command a courageous Danish detachment in Baghdad. So, it pains me to see the current dispute that is threatening to break the North Atlantic Alliance. The reasons why the international order that has lasted 80 years is failing to keep the peace are complex, but the proposed US land-grab of Denmark’s autonomous territory is a symptom, not a cause.

Trump’s justification for taking Greenland by force is similar to Argentina’s occupation of The Falklands, or Mussolini’s intimidation and invasion of Albania. It doesn’t help that Europe has neglected Arctic security since the Cold War and did nothing about the US intervention in Venezuela. But, history tells us that bullies cannot be appeased, so any unwelcome US seizure of territory belonging to a European sovereign state must be resisted.

British Tanks In Northern Norway

Why Change The Age Limit Of The Strategic Reserve?

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

The government’s announcement this week that the age limit for the Strategic Reserve (former armed forces personnel) will increase by a ten years to 65 is unsurprising. This means not only that those born between 1961 and 1971 will now be liable to mobilisation in the event of a war with Russia, but also that 60 year-old specialists might be sent to Ukraine and other hot-spots if their rare skills are required by the military. This might for example affect doctors, civil engineers, or even cyber-warriors. But why make this announcement now?

One of the key reasons is that those younger than 55 will have no personal experience of preparing for war against Russia. Whereas those born in the 1960s not only will have experience of the relevant Pillars of British Defence Policy from 1989 (Defence of the Home Base, Continental Commitment on the Central Front and Flanks of Europe, Maritime Commitment), but they may also have experience of our two most important wars of that era, the liberations of the Falklands and Kuwait.

In theory, the change does make sense, but in practice there will be huge problems. Similar to all contact sports, fighting is a young person’s game. How many 60 year-olds are still playing rugby, or can pass a battle fitness test by running one and a half miles in 12 minutes and then do an 12 hour shift on the front line, or in an ops room?

This policy may paper over some cracks, but it does not address the real problem the government faces of recruiting and sustaining a meaningful armoured formation that can deploy and fight a long war. It’s time for National Conscription!

Changing Allies

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

In General Shane Hackett’s outstanding book about World War III, which was based on the United Kingdom’s Defence Planning Assumptions in the 1970s, Britain’s principal ally in the Middle East was not Israel or Saudi Arabia, but Persia. Our 20th century history is littered with instances when we waged war against former allies. For example, in World War I we fought alongside Italy and Japan, both of which became enemies in World War II. Will 2026, be remembered as another of these occasions when an aggressive former ally becomes our enemy?

To my mind, the global upheaval we are experiencing is similar to those in 1935 and 1979 when Italy broke the League of Nations and the Shah of Iran was overthrown. Responding to the latest conflicts and threats of military interventions, the United Nations has proven to be as inept as its predecessor at keeping the Peace, so we are now into an era of Partisan War.

No doubt our government will attempt to survive the new Threat by adapting like a chameleon. However, some hard choices lie ahead if we are to prepare Gen Z for the worst case scenario – the military break up of NATO.

Ukraine For Venezuela – Part Two

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

Two weeks ago, I suggested that President Trump had done a deal with President Putin that effectively traded Ukraine for Venezuela and allowed each other to militarily subsume two of the largest sovereign states on the planet. Yesterday, this idea was realised as the World witnessed a generation defining event when America struck at strategic targets inside Venezuela and captured President Maduro (for the record the size of Venezuela is 912,050 square kilometres – it is more than twice the size of Iraq).

Newscasters and commentators have struggled to put this into context. Channel 4 tried to liken it to the Millennium interventions into Afghanistan, Iraq (and Libya), with their associated troubles. This was rightly swatted away because a) those expeditions were in response to the most heinous crime in human history (9/11) and b) they occurred in countries with deep sectarian and/or historical schisms.

Others have suggested that Putin and Trump are attempting to take us back to the Cold War era, when the World was effectively managed by the two Superpowers. However, this model does not work for me partly because the World is more disordered now than after WWII and partly because the World’s demographics and wealth have shifted over the past 50 years with China, India and Arabia tilting the balance.

It is well-known that Putin thought little of the Soviet system and harks back further to Tsarist era, when Russia built its Empire by leaning on its neighbours walls until they crumbled. We also know that President Trump admires Putin’s methodology. So the question is: will this be another Iraq or Vietnam with puppet-regimes dogged by military insurgency, or will it be more like the Philippines, when President Aguinaldo was captured by American forces on 23 March 1901 and the country was later governed as a US Territory? Only time will tell.

Military Gap Year Not What It Seems

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

My idea of a gap year is when school leavers fill the time between school and university (usually 14 months) with “no-commitment” growing-up activities, such as travel, adventure, art, sport and short-term, money-earning jobs. Of course, it can also mean post university and career gaps, but by then people are more fixed in their minds in terms of values and attitude.

The British Military Gap Year Scheme which was announced yesterday is not quite like this. For a start, it requires a two-year commitment and entails a three month basic military training course. All it seems to be doing, is reducing the normal three-year commitment to two. The under-25s who enrol in this scheme will not deploy on active operations, which seems strange to me because these are the best bits – barrack life can be pretty dull and monotonous.

I completely support the sentiments of encouraging families to consider the military as worthwhile careers and the so-called “whole-of-society” approach to defence and deterrence, but this announcement provides no detail about what skills will be offered and unfortunately will not fill the real Armed Forces Gap.

Recruit Training 25 Years Ago