Rupert Wieloch

In my first book, I revealed what the UK contributed to American thinking after 9/11 (the worst ever terrorist attack on British people). The most important intervention was to delay the US military attacks in Afghanistan until Washington had built a multi-national coalition, similar to those constructed for the Korean War and the Liberation of Kuwait. This was not an easy task.

It certainly helped our cause that the North Atlantic Council declared that 9/11 was a breach of Article 5, treating it as an attack against all Members. In solidarity, the United Nations had also adopted Resolution 1368, calling on all States to bring to justice the perpetrators of the horrific attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. However, it still needed a huge amount of shuttle diplomacy and creative thinking to develop an agreed strategy.

In the discussions at the highest level in London, there was a tension between the advocates of “strategic patience” and those who were keen to “attack first and ask questions afterwards”. This was replicated in Washington where the hawkish Donald Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense disagreed with Colin Powell’s State Department. When the Prime Minister and a bevy of senior military officers travelled to Washington 10 days after the event, he managed to sway the argument in favour of building a coalition. We then had a frantic week when all the British Ambassadors were given the task of persuading foreign governments to make a contribution to the campaign. To my mind, the resulting coalition is one of the great diplomatic successes of world history. It stood firm until Washington pulled the plug 20 years later and should be used as a teaching example on International Relations university degrees.

As I wait patiently in Sri Lanka for a return flight to Blighty, I am seized by this question about the efficacy of soft power. A major part of the Strategic Defence Review in 2010 centred on Defence Diplomacy. The buzz words were “Down Stream Conflict Prevention”, which translated to a range of confidence-building initiatives from disarmament to deployed training assistance teams. However the Down Side was less hard power with huge cuts to the Army to pay for two new Aircraft Carriers and the supporting fleet ships (which have played no part in the latest Middle East crisis).

The prognosis is not good. Hard power is still King, with the advocates of soft power looking impotent. The key tenets of the Geneva convention and other military law books have been shredded. The UN’s agreed rules (minimum force, self-defence, impartiality and consent) have been ignored. And yet, through it all, HM King Charles III has today highlighted a soft power international institution of 56 member nations that has lasted the test of time and still speaks as a Force For Good.

Sri Lanka this week has epitomised the spirit of the Commonwealth by responding to a humanitarian SOS, while maintaining its independence and neutrality. I have found that Sril Lankans are immensely proud of their heritage, whether that is the ancient influences, or the Dutch, Potuguese and British eras. They stopped the Japanese advance after Hong Kong and Singapore surrendered in World War II and have very effective Armed Forces. But, as they raise their flag here each morning, they also act as a beacon to others by saying “don’t give up on soft power”.

Of all the principles of war, the one that springs to mind this weekend is the first, Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. Having worked at the military-strategic level, it is the one that causes most friction between senior military commanders and politicians. Perhaps this is the cause of the apparent rift this week between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US President over Operation Epic Fury.

Is this a case of 19th century gun-boat diplomacy on steroids, or merely a distraction to avoid scrutiny about the American Epstein Scandal and ICE deaths? Whatever it is, I do remember that after 9/11 (the worst terrorist attack on British people) there was a moral debate in England about assassination and regime change, both of which were, under British law, deemed illegal.

Those were the days when the West still advocated a rules-based, international order, in order to preserve Global peace. However, that no longer seems to be the Aim. Instead, we have a wish list of objectives, which appear to be leading to chaos, instability and inevitably a civil-war that will dwarf the recent conflict in Syria. As America found in Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenge is not achieving military victory, but winning the subsequent peace.

The pronouncement by a former Prime Minister that Britain should send non-combat troops to safe parts of Ukraine is very misleading. In the first place, we have all seen that no part of Ukraine is safe from Russian missile, or drone attacks – the front line is everywhere. More importantly, the notion that the British Army has non-combat troops is false. All British soldiers are first and foremost taught to fight; their secondary skill set might take them to different echelons, but logisticians, administrators, medics and mechanics must be able to pass their personal weapons test every year, as well as other battlefield competences.

Don’t get me wrong, I agree that we should send British troops to Ukraine now to demonstrate to Russia that the West believes Ukraine must remain a free, independent country in Europe. Waiting for a ceasefire, as the current government suggests, only plays into Putin’s hands and allows him to keep advancing in the Donbas.

The talk about defence spending is also poorly articulated. We need politicians to translate 3.5% of GDP into meaningfulness (i.e. what it costs to send brigades, ships and aircraft to war and sustain them for two or three years). It is time to instil a readiness culture in Britain, including the reintroduction of national service for all British school-leavers.

I am looking forward to giving my talk on two iconic battles of the Korean War tomorrow evening. As we sit between the 75th anniversaries of the Inchon Landings and the Battle of Imjin, it is worth reflecting on four lessons from that three year war, which resulted in over 2 Million deaths.

The first lesson is how the Free World came together to fight an authoritarian regime that invaded its neighbour. We saw the same thing when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The second is how President Truman said no when General MacArthur demanded that he should widen the war for all-out victory. Above all else, avoid nuclear Armageddon.

The third is about humanitarian operations to save refugees (the Miracle of Christmas) and prevent the forcible repatriation of prisoners when it is known they will be slaughtered (as happened to the Cossacks after World War II).

The fourth is how 73 years after the armistice, there is still no peace treaty and the Demilitarized Zone is the most heavily guarded frontier in the World. As MacArthur said: “There is no substitute for Victory”.

Each of these lessons is relevant to what is happening in Ukraine four years after Russia launched a full-scale invasion into its neighbour. If there is an armistice this year, we don’t have far to look for a precedent.

Centurion Tank At The Time Of The Korean War

Three topics relevant to British Armed Forces tempted me to provide some context this week. However, I will save my observations about UN Failures, Chinese Security and Defence and The World’s Policeman for later in the month. Instead, I will concentrate on reinforcing my previous post about the false accusation that the USA never asked for military support in Afghanistan with evidence from two archival reports.

The first is drawn from the MoD lessons learned report from Afghanistan in 2002. “Following the defeat and removal of the Taleban regime in late 2001, the UK main effort focused on the leadership of ISAF to stabilise Kabul and ensure the meeting of the Loya Jurga in June. Meanwhile, US forces concentrated on the destruction of the remaining enemy pockets of resistance, particularly in the south-east, culminating in Operation Anaconda launched on 1 March 2002. The US was surprised at the ferocity of this battle and lost 8 men KIA… On 15 March 2002, the US formally requested the deployment of a UK fighting force and three days later [our] Secretary of State announced the deployment of a battle group, based on 45 Commando Royal Marines to come under tactical command of Commander 10 US Mountain Division.” In this role, Task Force Jacana as it was known, undertook four deliberate operations on the front line before it was withdrawn in July. There were many tactical lessons identified, but strategically, the mission was a huge success as it sent a powerful message to both friendly and hostile nations and allowed the Loya Jurga trouble-free progress against a background of relative security.

The second substantial US request came in 2005. Up to this point, British Armed Forces had run a very successful Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the north of the country. Washington now asked London if it would take over the PRT in Helmand Province as it was having difficulty gaining traction outside of the provincial capital. I deployed in October with the planning team to Kandahar, where a Royal Air Force Harrier flight was based. My task was to map out the urgent operational requirements for soldiers, vehicles, helicopters and the costs of third line support. There were also officers there to advise on reconstruction and economic alternatives to opium production. At that time, it was envisaged that we would send the Royal Anglian Regiment in 2006. However, this was changed to Headquarters 16 Air Assault Brigade together with a Parachute battalion. The resulting combat operation has been well-covered by the media in the past fortnight.

My final thought on this is to recognise the loss and sacrifices of all NATO nations in Afghanistan. I was a member of a guard of honour in Kandahar to say farewell to a Chinook crew that had been shot down. It was not just US and UK troops in that Ramp Parade saluting the dead as they were carried onto the C-17. All the national contingents were represented. To denigrate their contribution, as we heard last week, really is beyond the pale.

Helmand Task Force Planning Group in Kandahar 2005