There is a tendency in government departments (and especially the MoD) of avoiding difficult choices. An amusing story that illustrates this is the way Michael Heseltine, as Secretary of State for Defence, avoided making the decision to centralise the three Schools of Music after a number of studies concluded that only one was necessary and money could be transferred to front line troops if one of the three was chosen. A less amusing example is the way the Comprehensive Spending Review of 2007 created the Black Hole that subsequently devastated the Armed Forces fighting capabilities.
Senior officers are as much to blame as the politicians. Between 1999 and 2006, I witnessed countless occasions when the Executive Committee of the Army Board avoided difficult decisions about equipment policy and resources and retreated to their comfort zones of cap-badges and uniforms. The Future Rapid Effects System was a classic army project that failed because it was rooted in theory rather than reality. The problems with Ajax are inherited from that failure combined with the MoD’s headcount reduction forced on the Technical Director’s teams in Abbey Wood (e.g the Reliability and Maintenance Group).
History seems to be repeating itself this month. Politicians are retreating to their comfort zones and avoiding the difficult decisions to meet the Nation’s needs for Defence. Despite the reassuring words from Dan Jarvis this week, we are no closer to resolving the key issues of how to build credible capabilities for the next decade – UAVs may be part of the answer, but Air Power alone will not win a modern war as the USA has learned this year. We need strong armour to deal with the threat.










