Rupert Wieloch

Three topics relevant to British Armed Forces tempted me to provide some context this week. However, I will save my observations about UN Failures, Chinese Security and Defence and The World’s Policeman for later in the month. Instead, I will concentrate on reinforcing my previous post about the false accusation that the USA never asked for military support in Afghanistan with evidence from two archival reports.

The first is drawn from the MoD lessons learned report from Afghanistan in 2002. “Following the defeat and removal of the Taleban regime in late 2001, the UK main effort focused on the leadership of ISAF to stabilise Kabul and ensure the meeting of the Loya Jurga in June. Meanwhile, US forces concentrated on the destruction of the remaining enemy pockets of resistance, particularly in the south-east, culminating in Operation Anaconda launched on 1 March 2002. The US was surprised at the ferocity of this battle and lost 8 men KIA… On 15 March 2002, the US formally requested the deployment of a UK fighting force and three days later [our] Secretary of State announced the deployment of a battle group, based on 45 Commando Royal Marines to come under tactical command of Commander 10 US Mountain Division.” In this role, Task Force Jacana as it was known, undertook four deliberate operations on the front line before it was withdrawn in July. There were many tactical lessons identified, but strategically, the mission was a huge success as it sent a powerful message to both friendly and hostile nations and allowed the Loya Jurga trouble-free progress against a background of relative security.

The second substantial US request came in 2005. Up to this point, British Armed Forces had run a very successful Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the north of the country. Washington now asked London if it would take over the PRT in Helmand Province as it was having difficulty gaining traction outside of the provincial capital. I deployed in October with the planning team to Kandahar, where a Royal Air Force Harrier flight was based. My task was to map out the urgent operational requirements for soldiers, vehicles, helicopters and the costs of third line support. There were also officers there to advise on reconstruction and economic alternatives to opium production. At that time, it was envisaged that we would send the Royal Anglian Regiment in 2006. However, this was changed to Headquarters 16 Air Assault Brigade together with a Parachute battalion. The resulting combat operation has been well-covered by the media in the past fortnight.

My final thought on this is to recognise the loss and sacrifices of all NATO nations in Afghanistan. I was a member of a guard of honour in Kandahar to say farewell to a Chinook crew that had been shot down. It was not just US and UK troops in that Ramp Parade saluting the dead as they were carried onto the C-17. All the national contingents were represented. To denigrate their contribution, as we heard last week, really is beyond the pale.

Helmand Task Force Planning Group in Kandahar 2005

The government’s announcement this week that the age limit for the Strategic Reserve (former armed forces personnel) will increase by a ten years to 65 is unsurprising. This means not only that those born between 1961 and 1971 will now be liable to mobilisation in the event of a war with Russia, but also that 60 year-old specialists might be sent to Ukraine and other hot-spots if their rare skills are required by the military. This might for example affect doctors, civil engineers, or even cyber-warriors. But why make this announcement now?

One of the key reasons is that those younger than 55 will have no personal experience of preparing for war against Russia. Whereas those born in the 1960s not only will have experience of the relevant Pillars of British Defence Policy from 1989 (Defence of the Home Base, Continental Commitment on the Central Front and Flanks of Europe, Maritime Commitment), but they may also have experience of our two most important wars of that era, the liberations of the Falklands and Kuwait.

In theory, the change does make sense, but in practice there will be huge problems. Similar to all contact sports, fighting is a young person’s game. How many 60 year-olds are still playing rugby, or can pass a battle fitness test by running one and a half miles in 12 minutes and then do an 12 hour shift on the front line, or in an ops room?

This policy may paper over some cracks, but it does not address the real problem the government faces of recruiting and sustaining a meaningful armoured formation that can deploy and fight a long war. It’s time for National Conscription!

In General Shane Hackett’s outstanding book about World War III, which was based on the United Kingdom’s Defence Planning Assumptions in the 1970s, Britain’s principal ally in the Middle East was not Israel or Saudi Arabia, but Persia. Our 20th century history is littered with instances when we waged war against former allies. For example, in World War I we fought alongside Italy and Japan, both of which became enemies in World War II. Will 2026, be remembered as another of these occasions when an aggressive former ally becomes our enemy?

To my mind, the global upheaval we are experiencing is similar to those in 1935 and 1979 when Italy broke the League of Nations and the Shah of Iran was overthrown. Responding to the latest conflicts and threats of military interventions, the United Nations has proven to be as inept as its predecessor at keeping the Peace, so we are now into an era of Partisan War.

No doubt our government will attempt to survive the new Threat by adapting like a chameleon. However, some hard choices lie ahead if we are to prepare Gen Z for the worst case scenario – the military break up of NATO.

Two weeks ago, I suggested that President Trump had done a deal with President Putin that effectively traded Ukraine for Venezuela and allowed each other to militarily subsume two of the largest sovereign states on the planet. Yesterday, this idea was realised as the World witnessed a generation defining event when America struck at strategic targets inside Venezuela and captured President Maduro (for the record the size of Venezuela is 912,050 square kilometres – it is more than twice the size of Iraq).

Newscasters and commentators have struggled to put this into context. Channel 4 tried to liken it to the Millennium interventions into Afghanistan, Iraq (and Libya), with their associated troubles. This was rightly swatted away because a) those expeditions were in response to the most heinous crime in human history (9/11) and b) they occurred in countries with deep sectarian and/or historical schisms.

Others have suggested that Putin and Trump are attempting to take us back to the Cold War era, when the World was effectively managed by the two Superpowers. However, this model does not work for me partly because the World is more disordered now than after WWII and partly because the World’s demographics and wealth have shifted over the past 50 years with China, India and Arabia tilting the balance.

It is well-known that Putin thought little of the Soviet system and harks back further to Tsarist era, when Russia built its Empire by leaning on its neighbours walls until they crumbled. We also know that President Trump admires Putin’s methodology. So the question is: will this be another Iraq or Vietnam with puppet-regimes dogged by military insurgency, or will it be more like the Philippines, when President Aguinaldo was captured by American forces on 23 March 1901 and the country was later governed as a US Territory? Only time will tell.

My idea of a gap year is when school leavers fill the time between school and university (usually 14 months) with “no-commitment” growing-up activities, such as travel, adventure, art, sport and short-term, money-earning jobs. Of course, it can also mean post university and career gaps, but by then people are more fixed in their minds in terms of values and attitude.

The British Military Gap Year Scheme which was announced yesterday is not quite like this. For a start, it requires a two-year commitment and entails a three month basic military training course. All it seems to be doing, is reducing the normal three-year commitment to two. The under-25s who enrol in this scheme will not deploy on active operations, which seems strange to me because these are the best bits – barrack life can be pretty dull and monotonous.

I completely support the sentiments of encouraging families to consider the military as worthwhile careers and the so-called “whole-of-society” approach to defence and deterrence, but this announcement provides no detail about what skills will be offered and unfortunately will not fill the real Armed Forces Gap.

Recruit Training 25 Years Ago

I cannot believe the Libya is still using Colonel Gaddafi’s private jet aircraft for their military chiefs’ flights. In 2012, I was flown from Mitiga Air Base to El Adem in one of Gaddafi’s Falcon 50 jets. Even to my layman’s eyes it was clear that maintenance schedules were not being completed because the tradesmen had sold their tools during the civil war to buy food for their families. The fleet of MiGs, Sukhois and Falcons needed to be replaced and the infrastructure renovated. The Chief of the Libyan Air Force invited me to bring out British contractors to bid for the work, which I managed to do before the end of my tour.

The tragic crash of the Libyan Falcon 50 that caused the death of their Army Chief, General Haddad and other military officials in Turkey has put this aircraft in the spotlight again. Between the three possible causes of a terrorist attack, pilot error or bad-maintenance, my guess is the third. Given the amount of oil and gas money in Libya it seems extraordinary that the government has not upgraded their VIP aircraft since the overthrow of Gadhaffi.

Maintenance Hangar At The Libyan Airbase in El Adem

Following the tragic death of Corporal George Hooley last week, the Media has highlighted the case of an ex-British soldier captured on the front line soon after joining the Ukrainian Foreign Legion last year. The UK’s Foreign Office statement demanding that Russia “stop using prisoners of war for political and propaganda purposes” reminds me that not much has changed since 1920, when the British soldiers in my book, Churchill’s Abandoned Prisoners, were deceived by Bolshevik Commissars and incarcerated in political prisons in Moscow.

However, this was not the main event this week. The news that the EU is providing more financial support for Ukraine is very welcome, but the Russian President’s end-of-year address catches the eye as the centrepiece. The fact that Putin no longer portrays the USA as his biggest threat even though the US Commander-in-Chief is now attacking Russia’s most important trading and military ally in Latin America makes me think something dramatic has changed this year. Have Putin and Trump agreed an undeclared deal behind the scenes – Ukraine for Venezuela?