China Is Still Rising

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

Twenty-four years ago, during a Chatham House seminar that I attended, the panel predicted that China would overtake the USA’s economy in the late 2020s. At that time China was assessed by the Government as posing “no conventional military threat to the UK”. Furthermore, Washington was sharing technology and military information with Beijing, as the Pentagon had placed all US Army doctrine on the internet, which was freely accessible by anyone.

This came to a head on 1 June 2011 during the British Chief of the General Staff’s main conference before the Coalition Government’s Strategic Defence Review. In the Keynote session, the Deputy Chief of The People’s Liberation Army (General Zhang Qinsheng) gave a well-received address about the Strategic Context and Nature of Conflict (lots of Sun-Tzu). The following day, when the Commanding General of US Cyber Command was asked probing questions by the Chinese delegates, it became clear that the relationship was changing.

Since then, China has extended its influence throughout the World through democracy and economics. There is a certain irony that while Putin and Trump have failed in their recent military operations against Ukraine and Iran, their attempts to return to the bipolar Cold War have merely opened the door to President Xi. The photographs of him with the US and Russian Presidents this month remind me of images of Medieval Kings visiting the Pope. Not only has Washington lost half its Allies in Europe, but its Intelligence fraternity has lost huge influence in London with respect to the Government’s relations with China (e.g. permission for the new Chinese Embassy to proceed). The big question is: will the City follow?

NATO Boosted By America…Again

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

The news that the USA is deploying 5,000 troops to Poland is most welcome at this time of heightened security in the European countries bordering Russia.

After returning from an operational tour in Bosnia in 1995, I was drawn into the largest Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise in Poland and Germany. Our deployment to Krakow pre-dated the British armoured battlegroup exercises that resulted from its success and led to the first three Warsaw Pact nations joining NATO in March 1999 (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic). PfP was an initiative of the Clinton Administration to work together for the best future of Europe. Not only was it highly successful in helping Eastern European countries become democracies, but it also continues to this day with 18 “Partner Members”, including Ukraine.

Subsequently, Poland was a great support to the USA in Iraq. I had a very strong team led by a Polish colonel with a company of mechanised soldiers under command in Baghdad, so I am not surprised that the Washington is honouring their debt to Warsaw with the latest news of this deployment. It will certainly help in deterring Russia from invading the Baltic countries in the immediate future.

If Politicians Make Mistakes…

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

In 1916, Britain (and France) went through the toughest time of World War I. It was a year of ever-increasing strain, catastrophe and disappointment. While the French were bled white at Verdun, the Easter Rising in Dublin changed the assumption that the Irish would wholeheartedly support the Allies. The disaster at Kut in April, where 13,000 troops were marched into captivity, altered the perceptions about the “side-shows”, just as Gallipoli had in 1915. On 1 June, the Royal Navy’s losses at Jutland shocked the Government and four days later the country went into mourning when the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, was drowned en route to Russia.

The second half of the year was even worse for Prime Minister Herbert Asquith. The Battle of the Somme, which began on 1 July, became synonymous with the waste of life that embodied the war in France. The Arab Revolt launched in June fell flat and the rate of British merchant vessels sunk by submarines increased dramatically (41 ships and 176,248 tonnes in October).

Against this background, Lord Lansdowne wrote a memorandum about peace terms with Germany. Asquith hesitated for too long and was evicted from Downing Street, to be replaced by the dynamic David Lloyd George. In response, John Buchan (one of my favourite authors at school) wrote: “If politicians make mistakes, it isn’t from lack of good instruction to guide their steps.” He might have added that the failure to articulate clear objectives and clear policy is a political death trap.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we are currently seeing political leaders who are hesitating in their decision-making just when they need to offer clarity to their followers and the wider public. My advice to both of them is don’t make the same mistake as Herbert Asquith and listen to your best advisors, not the loudest voices.

Operation Torch and The Capture Of Tunis

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

I am looking forward to giving my talk on the Allied battles in French North Africa tomorrow in Winchester, especially as it was the 83rd anniversary of the capture of Tunis by Lieutenant General Horrock’s IX Corps on Thursday.

This is another forgotten campaign that was pivotal in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Although it lasted only six months (8 November 1942 to 13 May 1943), it is important historically because it was the first occasion in WWII when British and American formations fought together side by side. It also introduced key American military leaders such as Eisenhower, Clark, Patton and Bradley to armoured warfare. It turned France from foe to friend. And its result was as devastating to Hitler as Stalingrad, with 350,000 of his best soldiers killed, or taken prisoner and 3,000 aircraft lost.

After the successful landings on Operation Torch, the USA made many mistakes, such as their flirtation with Nazi sympathiser, Admiral Darlan (who fortunately was assassinated on Christmas Eve). When II (US) Corps failed in battle, tensions between the Allies were tested. Monty put it pithily in his memoir “It was the old story: lack of proper training allied to no experience of war, and linked with too high a standard of living. They were going through their early days, just as we had to go through ours…When the Americans had learnt their lesson, and had gained experience, they proved themselves to be first-class troops. It took time; but they did it more quickly than we did.”

In preparation for my talk, I have been reading Eisenhower’s memoir and two stories strike me as important in the development of US forces from a peacetime army to a mission-focused, well-oiled machine. The first was in Algiers when he found that his orders to support British First Army in the Race for Tunis “were not clearly understood nor vigorously executed” An American Brigade commander had asked for M3 Half Tracks to take his troops the 700 miles to the front line, but the American staff officer to whom he was appealing had refused permission “on the ground that the march would consume half the useful life of the vehicle!” This staff officer had not accepted that war is synonymous with waste and that “every positive action requires expenditure”. Within five minutes of this issue reaching Ike, the brigadier was on his way with the orders he sought.

The second story is how Eisenhower dealt with II Corps after it failed in the battles of Kasserine Pass and Fondouk. He had a long discussion with General Alexander and asked that II Corps should not be removed from the line of battle. but instead should be employed as a whole in the final assault (Op Strike). Partly, this was because he realised that the bulk of the ground forces required by the Allies to defeat Germany would have to come from America and the need for more battle training was self-evident. There was also an urgent need to provide a sense of accomplishment to the people back home and to generate an effective sense of partnership. II Corp’s subsequent successful capture of Bizerte on 7 May fully justified Ike’s decision.

Since the British Army is currently suffering from peacetime-itis, they would do well to study this campaign for its important lessons about success in war.

IX Corps In Tunis

Denial – The New Reason For Going To War

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

There used to be only three legal reasons for a country to go to war.

The oldest and most incontrovertible is self-defence. If one country invades another’s territory, the victim has a fundamental right, enshrined in international law, that allows it to protect and defend itself. Associated with this core entitlement is the right to come to the aid of an ally, as in the NATO Article 5 clause.

The second reason is if the United Nations agrees to a Security Council Resolution, as in the case of the Korean War in 1950 and the Gulf War in 1991.

The third reason, which stems from the tragedies in Bosnia and Rwanda, was agreed at the UN’s 2005 World Summit; to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Since then, another reason has emerged – Denial. We have seen it with Putin’s so called special military operation to deny Ukraine joining NATO and we have now seen it with Trump’s war in the Gulf to deny Iran from developing its nuclear ambitions. In response, Iran has been denying access through the Strait of Hormuz and this in turn has led to a US blockade to deny Iran’s oil trade with Asia.

Denial has always been a part of the operational framework of war and “fixing the enemy”. By denying them the opportunity to achieve their goals, the aim is to throw adversaries off balance before defeating them on the battlefield. On land, this phase is usually masterminded by the senior sapper with minefields, bridge demolitions and an intricate obstacle plan. But in the modern sense, it is more in the hands of the airmen to attack infrastructure with bombs, missiles and drones.

The problem with this half-way house is that Denial in itself is like Deterrence, it doesn’t defeat the enemy. However, the advantage is that it provides political leaders with an opportunity to deny the country is At War and that the rest of the World is suffering the consequences.

Don’t They Know They Owe Us?

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

In 2008, I had the privilege of briefing three of America’s top generals in Baghdad; Petraeus, Odierno and Austin. I also had to write two important political scripts for my three star commander. The first was an appeal to NATO Ambassadors to send more troops to Iraq as part of the multi-national mission to assist the Iraqi security forces deal with the ongoing insurgency. The second was an update for the visiting Congressional Delegation on what military equipment the Iraqi Government was buying.

This political delegation was cross-party and included some passionate patriots shepherded by a retired general who was involved in the 2003 Phase 4 (post-victory) operation. The civilian members of the delegation asked pertinent questions, but were clearly frustrated by some of the answers we gave. I recognised the same frustrations from a House of Commons Defence Inquiry into the UK response to 9/11. It all boiled over when the delegation was told that the Iraqi government had just bought a fleet of minesweepers from Malaysia rather than from an American contractor; at which point an apoplectic congressman said: “Don’t They Know They Owe Us?” The delegation simply could not understand why the vast majority of Iraqis were not grateful to the USA for removing their despotic leader and for bombing their country with shock and awe.

One of America’s greatest literary figures, Samuel Langhorne Clemens, aka Mark Twain, once wrote that “History never repeats itself”. This may be true, but in the case of US wars in the Middle East, there is certainly a seamless pattern that borders on tessellation.

ANZAC Day – My Tribute

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

There is still much to be said about the wars in Ukraine and Middle East as well as Britain’s Strategic Defence Review, but today is ANZAC Day and so, I wish to honour the brave soldiers, sailors and air personnel who lost their lives fighting for a free world. My father was extremely proud to serve in the Australian Army for two years during the Korean War and he would be delighted that the Royal Family participated in the commemorations in London today.

Although the Aussies claim ownership of the Gallipoli Campaign, I believe their most important contribution in the two world wars was in North Africa in April 1941. This was the defence of Tobruk by Major General Leslie Morshead’s 6th Australian Division after the British 2nd Armoured Division capitulated in the desert battle with Erwin Rommel. The first hand-to-hand combat between Australia and Germany in World War II was a victory for the Southern Hemisphere and more importantly it showed the world that Hitler’s up-to-then invincible Blitzkrieg was beatable. But it came at a cost.

Rommel had ordered his armoured troops to attack the outer perimeter at 1700 hours on Easter Sunday. After a fierce artillery exchange, a breach in the line was exploited by the Afrika Korps. Sensing this critical moment, 22 year-old Lieutenant Austin Mackell of 2/17th Australian Infantry Battalion took out a fighting patrol and stumbled on a major enemy position with six machine guns, mortars and field guns. Mackell was involved with three enemy soldiers and called for help. A giant of a man from Wagga Wagga, Corporal John Hurst Edmondson, who was wounded in the neck and stomach, came across and rescued his platoon commander. Sadly he died of his wounds, but for his conspicuous bravery and sacrifice he was awarded the first Victoria Cross to be awarded to an Australian in World War II (14 April 1941).

The siege of Tobruk continued until November, when Colonel Sydney Hartnell of 19th New Zealand Battalion, part of General Auchinleck’s relief force, symbolically shook hands with Brigadier Arthur Willison, commanding 32 Brigade. The ANZAC bravery continued in North Africa in 1942, with five of the six VCs awarded in Egypt being presented to New Zealand and Australian soldiers. The full story is in my book, Liberating Libya.

I was never fortunate enough to be sent to the Antipodes during my time in the Army, but I did have an outstanding young New Zealand artillery detachment under command in Bosnia in 1995. When we were attacked by the Bosnian Serb army, they all performed in combat in the finest traditions of their distinguished predecessors, who earned fame at Tobruk and El Alamein 50 years before.

Alamein 1942

Why The SDR Has Not Been Signed Off

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

There is a very important, long-standing convention agreed between the Treasury and Government Departments that is currently under question. In the past, whenever an unexpected crisis hits the country, the extra costs to the Departments on top of programmed activity is paid out of the Government Reserve. Examples since 2000 include the Foot and Mouth epidemic (which did for the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), Avian Flu and of course, Covid (Department of Health and Social Care).

In the case of the Ministry of Defence, the costs of the deployed operations to Iraq and Afghanistan were both picked up by the Treasury. This money alleviated the MoD at a very tricky time because we had effectively ran out of money for programmed activity in 2004. The Army benefitted in many ways, for example the specialist armoured vehicle fleet was completely upgraded between 2005 and 2010, thanks to this reserve fund.

The current costs of Britain’s military contribution to the war in the Middle East are the latest example of the use of the Treasury’s reserve…but they don’t like it. The official government line that we are only involved in defensive operations is a half-truth as it is designed to placate the many “Stop The War” groups that have emerged in the past few years. The truth is that the Permanent Joint Headqaurters is a hive of activity organising the maritime, air, land and special forces capabilities that are deployed in the Theatre of Operations. Some of these capabilities that have been neglected since they were pulled out of Afghanistan are now being upgraded with new technology through Urgent Operational Requirements that are incredibly expensive.

These extra costs have distorted the picture for the SDR and as a result the Treasury is trying to claw back money from the MoD, rather than dig into the reserve. Hence the unusual intervention from Lord Robertson this week. The real question is: why isn’t the Media reporting this?

Lord Robertson Is Right, but…

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

The eminent former NATO Secretary General bravely tackled the Welfare Budget issue yesterday, but he failed to talk about the two enormous elephants in the room. The first is how Britain’s education system has deliberately sabotaged the Armed Forces by denigrating military life and putting off young men and women from joining-up. The second is how money for the uniformed services has been syphoned-off by Security Mandarins in Vauxhall.

Twenty five years ago the Army’s Student Presentation Teams reported growing difficulty in accessing some urban schools even though they offered to deliver some of the National Curriculum’s mandated lessons. At that time, I spoke to over ten thousand head teachers and community leaders in towns and rural areass throughout England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. They were overwhelmingly supportive of the Armed Forces and the need to instil in young people a sense of duty to the country and high achievement, which in turn provided positive encouragement for a military career. However, since then, under the misguided banner of anti-elitism and the naive assumption that Britain is not under threat, military careers have been put in the dustbin and Lord Robertson’s “corrosive complacency” has taken hold in Whitehall.

The second “elephant” can be traced to the publication of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. That was the moment when the security services, which had been underfunded for decades by the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, licked their lips because they suddenly had access to the Armed Forces’ money. Adding a second whammy of making the MoD pay for the nuclear capability meant that the Army in particular was hollowed-out so much that it could no longer deploy and sustain a full armoured brigade on operations abroad. The mantra under successive governments was that the old way of fighting with main battle tanks was over. However, what has been made absolutely plain in Ukraine and Iran is that Air Power alone will not prevail and you still need large mechanised armies to defend your country.

The third issue was touched on briefly by some Media commentators yesterday. Why did it need an 80 year-old former MP to raise this issue? Winston Churchill was under 60 years old when he took up the re-armament issue in the early 1930s when appeasement was holding sway. He and others such as Hugh Dalton, a Welsh Labour MP who was three years younger than Churchill, were accused of warmongering, but they were proved to be right. So the real question is: where are the current MPs who will take up this cudgel, before it is too late?

A Time When Tanks Were Valued

Same Strategy As Russia: Reinforcing Red Lines

Posted on by Rupert Wieloch

When I was six years old, I spent much time playing board-games with my best friend, who went on to win the coveted “Financial Journalist of the Year Award in the City of London. Our favourite game was a strategy game of diplomacy, conflict and conquest named Risk, which required six players to form alliances, in order to capture territories and eventually take over the world. Inevitably, the six players were whittled down to my friend and I, who could never quite defeat each other and so, more often than not it ended in a draw.

At the time of the Cold War, Risk replicated the duality of a World dominated by the USSR and USA. Today, Globalisation has provided economic opportunities for regional powers to shed their obsequience and establish true independence. So why have Russia and America launched unpopular wars against very large independent countries, which are only benefitting their main economic rival? The simple answer is medium-range missiles, natural resources and allies. In the case of Putin, his red lines have always been: Preventing Kyiv from allowing NATO to build missile bases within range of Moscow; natural resources in the Donetsk; and Ukraine’s control of the Russian outlet into the Black Sea. Strangely, America’s red lines are similar: missiles that can reach Israel (with or without nuclear warheads); Iran’s key allies (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis); and Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz.

So after the failed diplomacy in Islamabad, the US President is again following Putin’s strategy by reverting to containment with a beefed-up blockade and an enormous amount of propaganda, in order to reinforce Israel’s Red Lines. In this high powered game of Risk, it does seem that America and Russia are using the same strategy, but that they are being outflanked by the third player, XI Jinping, because China has just become the number one car seller in the UK.